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rn TI-IE SUPREME carn.T 
OF TI-IE STATE OF UTAH 
CLUB STAi.'lYON STREEI', a Utah 
non-profit nembership 
corporation, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
1JrAH LIQUOR CONIROL CCl1MISSION, 
Respondent. 
Brief of Petitioner 
NATURE OF TI-IE CASE 
Case No. 16384 
This case arises from an administrative proceeding before the Utah 
liquor Control Comnission (hereinafter referred to as the Comnission) in which 
the Comnission purported to detennine whether Petitioner had violated provisions 
of the Liquor Control Act or any of the regulations of the Comnission. 
DISPOSITION BEFORE TI-IE CX11MISSION 
After refusing to corrqJly with the discovery requests of the Petitioner, 
the Comnission entered its evidence and the Petitioner then entered the evidence 
it had been able to obtain. Thereafter, the Comnission did make written 
Findings and Conclusions, and a written Order which found "a violation of Utah 
C.ode Annotated, Section 16-6-13.1(9) and Comnission Regulation A96-0l-5(6)(a) 
occurred, 11 and ordered a penalty of a one week suspension of the State liquor store 
and consumption licenses of the Club Stanyon Street. All references to the script 
of that proceeding are in parentheses and preceeded by the letter 11" 1 , and all 
references to other portions of the record are preceeded by the letter 1'R". 
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NATURE OF THE RELIEF SOUGHT 
In this action, Club Stanyon Street asks this OJurt to determine the 
abuses of discretion and excesses of jurisdiction of the Utah liquor OJntrol 
Corrrnission, to properly construe the statutes under which the OJrrrnission pur-
ported to act, to determine that the constitutional rights of the Club Stanyon 
Street have been violated, for an Order requiring the Corrrnission to vacate its 
Order of March 7, 1979 and to further order the OJrrrnission to e:xpunge its recorcs 
with regard to the alleged violations of l'bvember 14 and 22, 1978 and for such 
other relief as may seem appropriate to the OJurt. 
STATEMENI' OF FACTS 
This action began when charges were originally brought by the liquor 
law Ehforcerrent Division of the Depa:rtrrent of Public Safetj, ccmnonly referred 
to as the liquor Division. It was alleged that on lbvember 14 and fuvember 22, 
1978, an agent from the liquor Divisian entered the premises of the Club Stanyon 
Street and purchased an alcoholic beverage without being a rrember of the Club 
Stanyon Street. At the tine the agent allegedly entered the premises, he did 
not have a search warrant and did not divulge or disclose his· identitj or the 
reason for his presence to anyone within the Club, and no one within the Club 
was aware of such an alleged purchase until six (6) weeks after it allegedly 
occurred. 
The purchase of alcoholic beverages is not, per se, a violation, but 
only the purchase of alcoholic beverages by nonrrernbers of t.'l.e Club. Every week 
there are between 3, 000 and 6, 000 valid transactions in the Club Stanyon Street 
wherein alcoholic beverages are legally and lawfully sold. 
Six ~eks after the alleged violation, when the charges were brought 
against the Club Stanyon Street, the manager of the Club irmediately requestec 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-3-
permission for his errployees who were on duty on the nights in question to view 
the liquor agent so that they could atterrpt to refresh their rrennries as to what 
had transpired. In addition, counsel for Plaintiff further submitted discovery 
in an atterrpt to detennine the facts so that evidence and testim:my could be 
obtained and reviewed for the scheduled hearing. All discovery requests by 
the Club Stanyon Street and its counsel were ignored and no response was received 
thereon, and no answers to the discovery were received by counsel for Plaintiff. 
A hearing was finally held on March 7, 1979 wherein the only witness 
to testify regarding the alleged incident was the liquor agent. Because of the 
time interval between the alleged incident and the tine the Club was given notice 
of that incident, and further because there had been thousands of sales to 
members of the Club during that period, no officer, agent or errployee of the Club 
had any recollection of the alleged incident and could therefore not testify 
regarding the specific facts alleged. In fact, they could not even testify 
whether the agent was or was not in the Club on any occasion (T. 50) . 
There were, hovvever, not even any allegations that the manager or 
any officer or director of the Club had anything to do with the alleged sale, 
but instead it was clear that if the alleged incident did occur that any un-
lawful sales were ma.de by waitresses who had no managerial authority and had 
clearly been instructed by the managenent of the Club to serve drinks only to 
rrembers of the Club. In fact, Mr. Roy Kohler, the manager of the Club, testified 
that he had issued written directions to the employees that the Club was only 
for the use of its rrembers, that it was a private club where =nbership cards 
were required, that there ~d be no exceptions even for the personal friends 
of employees, and that every errployee was responsible for his or her own section 
to insure that everyone in the section was a =nber or a guest of a =nber (T.43). 
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He also testified that weekly employee rreetings were held wherein it was 
emphasized to only permit admittance or sales to nanbers of the Club, and that 
he also emphasized the sane thing every night when the waitress ~uld pick up 
the rroney she ~uld use to ITBke change that night, and he described the repetik 
of those statements every night as being like a record (T.49). 
The Club did in fact attempt to follow the law, and the Comnission' s 
Conpliance Supervisor, Mr. Joe Coccimiglio, testified that in the eighteen 
rronths prior to the hearing the liquor Division had perforrred eighteen (18) 
premise checks, plus ~ (2) open inspections of the Club, and in twenty (20) 
inspections of the Club, the agents noted the alleged violations involved in 
the proceeding plus one other violation of a similar nature which occurred on 
August 24, 1978. In the other seventeen (17) inspections during the prior 
eighteen (13) rronths, the agents either could not gain admittance to the Chili 
or did not note any violations (T.42-45). In addition, after these alleged 
violations but before the hearing, the liquor Division made at least three (3) 
and possibly four (4) additional inspections of the Club, and the agents were 
not able to gain admittance to the building without a nanbership card (T. 62). 
As to the alleged incidents themselves, the first alleged sale on 
tbvember 14, 1978 occurred when the Club was full at about 7 : 30 p. m. by a 
waitress narred Cathy (T. 33-34) , and Mr. Kohler testified that Cathy had been 
employed by the Club for about 3 to 4 years and was very concientious (T.50). 
The agent testified that he had been to the Club with a nanber of the Club on 
a previous occasion (T. 29-30). Ibwever, it ~d adrnittedly be speculative to 
to attempt to determine whether or not the waitress renanbered the agent from 
a prior visit , whether the rush of a full Club during a busy period, or whether 
just a rrental lapse caused the incident, if it did in fact oc=. 
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'Il1e second alleged incident occurred when the agent was allegedly 
served a drink by a waitress narred Parrela Hendy on tbvember 22, 1980, which was 
the first day that Parrela Hendy was employed by the Club Stanyon Street (T. 51) . 
Even though it was her first day of ernployrrent, if the alleged incident did 
occur, it was because the bartender took the order while the waitress was at 
the restroom, and the waitress then served the drink when she returned (T. 35-36). 
while it may require sorre speculation, it is reasonable to assrne that tli.e bartender 
believed the waitress had already made a detennination of l!El!lbership while the 
waitress believed that the bartender had detennined the agent was a l!El!lber in 
the Club. 
When the liquor agent made his alleged inspections , he did not have 
a search warrant (T.11 and 23) and did not, in any manner, identify himself or 
the purpose of his visit. 
Also, at the hearing on March 7, 1979, the Comnission achnitted into 
evidence, and prestnnably considered in its decision, the State Toxicaligist's 
reports on samples allegedly taken at each of the alleged incidents without 
any witness to testify concerning those reports or the contents.or accuracy 
of those reports. 
ARGUMENI' 
POINI I 
THE AUEGED EN'IRY INrO THE CllJB STANYON STREIT FOR THE PURPOSES 
OF ENCOURAGI:N; AND CAUSI:N; A VIOLATION OF THE UTAH LIQUOR CONI'ROL 
ACT CONSTITUTED A VIOLATION OF THE CllJB STANYON STREET'S RIGHI'S 
UNDER THE FOURlH AND FCXJRTEEN'IH AMENrMENl'S OF THE UNITED STA'IES 
CDNSTITUTION AND UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITlJTION. 
W'hen the agent allegedly entered the Club Stanyon Street, he did not 
have, and had never obtained, a search warrant to search or inspect the premises, 
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and he never did present any credentials or exhibit any identification to an:" 
official or employee of the Club. 
The conduct of the agent was , therefore, in violation of the Club 
Stanyon Street's rights to be free from warrantless searches. 
The status of the law on this point was very capably S1.lllffi3.rized by 
Orristine M. D.Irharn, District Judge, in an unreported Merrorandum Opinion issued 
from the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County in the case 
of V-1 Oil <:orrpany, et al vs. Salt Lake City, et al., C79-75, dated the 8th 
day of February, 1979. Although it is sorrewhat lengthy, because of its quality, 
i.rrpartiality, and relevancy, a substantial portion of that opinion is as follrn·.~ 
"The constitutionality of warrantless inspections for 
various purposes has been reviewed several ti.Ires arid very 
recently by the United States Suprerre Court. In Cannra v. 
Munici al Court of the Cit and Coun of San Francisco, 
7 U.S. 7 and See v. City o Seatt e, 7 U.S. 541 
(1967), the Court reviewed ordiilarices permitting warrantless 
inspections of personal residences (Cannra) and of cormercial 
premises (See). In Cannra, the Court overruled Frank v. 
Meryland, TI9" U.S. 3~ch had upheld warrantless inspec-
tions for the purposes of locating a suspected public nuisance 
on the theory that m..micipal fire, health and housing programs 
"touch at rrost upon the periphery of the illportant interests 
safeguarded by the Fourteenth Am::!endment's protection against 
official intrusion" 359 U.S., at 367. The Cannra Court disagreed 
because of the criminal processes available for enforcerrent of 
fire, health, and housing codes, as well as criminal penalties 
for refusal to permit inspection. The Cannra Court dealt with 
the public interest argunent, advanced by Defendants in the 
instant case, as follows: 
... we think this argunent misses the mark. The 
question is not, at this stage at least, whether these 
inspections may be ma.de, but whether they may be ma.de 
without a warrant . . . It has nowhere been urged that 
fire, health and housing code inspection programs could 
not achieve their goals within the confines of a reason-
able search warrant requirerrent. 1lrus , we do not find 
the public need argunent dispositive 
387 U.S., 533. 
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In Camara, the goverrmental interest was described as the 
preventiOr!Of' 'even the un:intentimal development of conditions 
which are hazardous to public health and safety", 387 U.S. , at 
535, an interest indistinguishable from that in question in this 
case. Routine area inspections \~uld not be precluded by the 
requirem:nt of a warrant procedure after entry has initially 
been refused, the Court held, because "if a valid public interest 
justifies the intrusion conterrplated, then there is probable 
cause to issue a suitably restricted search warrant". 387 U.S. 
at 539. The Court specifically noted that the requirem:nt of a 
warrant procedure "does not suggest any change in what seems 
to be the prevailing local policy, in !IDSt situations, of 
authorizing entry, but not entry by force, to inspect". 387 
U.S., at 540. 
In See v. City of Seattle, slfilri, a companion case to 
Camara, the c.ourt extended his ho g in Camara to similar 
lllSpections of cO!llIErcial premises not useaasprivate residences. 
The inspection involved was a routine inspection for fire and 
safety hazards, and the Court held "that administrative entry, 
without consent, upon the portions of cO!llIErcial premises which 
are not open to the public may only be compelled, through 
prosecution or physical force within the frClll"eW)rk of a 
warrant procedure". 378 U.S. , at 545. 
Most recently, in the 1979 case of Marshall v. Barlow's, 
Inc., 98 S. Ct. 1816, the Court applied its hOldiiigs in Camara 
ana-See to inspections authorized by the Occupational Sarecy--
and Health AI;t of 1970. That opinion distinguishes a parallel 
line of cases pennitting warrantless searches in certain 
industries which ''have such a history of goverrment oversight 
that no reasonable expectation of privacy could exist for 
a proprietor over the stock of such an enterprise". 98 S. Ct. , 
at 1821. liquor and firearms constitute such industries (See 
the Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 
1979, and United States v. Loam ArithOriy BiSYiell, 406 U.S. 311, 
1972), and a recent federal district court decision includes 
coal mining within that limited class. See H~rshall V .· Donofris, 
No. 78-2667, OSHR, Nov. 14, 1978, p. 1175, reported ll1 47 law 
Week 24ll. Defendants here argue that food preparation is such 
a heavily regulated industry, but aside from the base assertion, 
no facts or historical review is offered to show the kind of 
regulation and governm:ntal oversight (federal in nature) fou:id . 
in Colormade and BiSYiell, supra. Further!IDre, the very restrictive 
view of SUCh exceptions to general warrant requirem:nts taken 
by the Utah Supreme Court is evidenced by ~ cases involving 
establishrrents which retail liquor. In Salt L3ke Cit; v. Wheeler, 
466 P. 2d 838, 1970, and Utah v. Salt Lake Cit~ The agabOrid 
Club v. Salt L3ke C~, 445 P. Zd 691, 1968, t Utah Supreme 
C.Ourt clearly heldt a city regulatory licensing scheme involving 
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warrantless searches of non-profit clubs was unconstituti=l 
(Vagabond), and that a statute pennitting periodic police inspec-
tions without warrants of premises where liquor is consurred is 
likewise offensive to the constitutional protections afforded by 
the Fourth .Anendrrent. The Court reviewed the Colonnade decision, 
which had just been completed by the United States Suprerre Court, 
and concluded "the case lends no comfort to the City", 466 P. 2d, 
at 840. fu different result can be required here , where the 
rationale which supported Colonnade and Biswell is even less 
available than it was in Wheeler and VagabOild. This Court therefore 
finds that Section 100-13-202, Revised Ormrumces of Salt Lake City, 
is unconstitutional to the extent it pennits warrantless searches 
of comrercial premises without consent. Plaintiffs are entitled to 
a preli.rniary injunction restraining the Defendants from conducting 
or attempting to conduct warrantless health inspections of their 
gasoline station unless consent has been obtained, or fran pro-
secuting or penalizing Plaintiffs in any fashion pursuant to 
related ordinances for failure to pennit such warrantless inspection: 
W:Ule the standards for warrantless searches by the United States 
Suprene Court are strict, the standards for such warrantless searches as 
established by the Utah Suprerre Court are even IIDre strict. In State v. Salt 
Lake City, (Vagabond) 21 Utah 2d 318, 445 P.2d 691 (1968) this Court said: 
In the Camara case, the court observed that the question was 
not whether an inspection may be made, but whether it IM.Y be 
made withotit a warrant. The court held that searches of this 
kind "are significant intrusions upon the Fourth .Anendrrent, 
that such searches when authorized and conducted without 
a warrant procedure lack the traditional safeguards which 
the Fourth .Anendrrent guarantees to the individual, and 
that the reasons put forth in Frank v. i~land, 359 U.S. 
360, 79 S.Ct. 804, 3 L.E.d.2d 877 and in~er cases for 
upholding these warrantless searches are insufficient to 
justify so substantial a weakening of the Fourth .Anendermt' s 
protections." 
In See v. Seattle, the court held that the basic com-
ponent of a reasonable search under the Fourth .Anendrrent--
that it is not to be enforced without suitable warrant 
procedure--is ~licable to business as well as residential 
premises. There ore, an entry upon comrercial premises not 
open to the public may only be compelled within the frarre-
work of a warrant procedure. (Emphasis added.) 
Also, in Salt Lake City v. Wheeler, 24 Utah 2d 112, 466 P. 2d 838 (1970), this 
Court again struck down a city ordinance which pennitted warrantless searches 
In Wheeler, the conduct authorized by the ordinance was nearly identical to 
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the actual conduct of the agent in these alleged violations. The ordinance 
in that case provided: 
"The Police Departrrent shall be permitted to have access to all 
premises licensed or applying for license.under this chapter 
and shall make periodic inspections of said premises and report 
its findings to the Board of Comnissioners." 
In holding that ordinance to be unconstitutional, this C.Ourt stated: 
"It seems obvious from a casual reading of the ordinance 
that, of all the rrunicipal agencies, the police depa.rtrrent alone 
is accorded the right of entry without a search warrant, to 
"inspect" any or all the premises for which the license is issued, 
without reservation or restriction as to the private or public 
portions thereof, without any specified protection against a 
plenary power to prowl the premises. It is reasonably fore-
seeable that under som: circumstances, where a warrantless 
entry may have been accomplished, an erstwhile right of an 
accused to suppression of evidence or his right of irrm.mity 
from selfincrirnination well might be foreclosed simply because 
the word "inspect" instead of "search" may be employed in the 
ordinance. C.Ounsel implies that "inspection" may be SOirething 
other than "search" in a Fourth Arrendmmt sense. The Authorities 
seem to dispel any such distinction by making the two ~~rds 
synonynous in both the ordinary and constitutional senses. Id. 
at 839. 
The applicable statutes and regulations purport to require the 
sane access for liquor agents as the city ordinance in the I-heeler case required 
for the Police Depart:rrent. Section 16-6-13.7(9), Utah C.Ode Arinotated, 1953, 
as arrended, provides: 
The Comnission' s own Rules and Regulations adopt the identical 
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''Inspection. 
Representatives of c.omnission, the Citizens Advisory Cmmcil, 
the State Division of Liquor law Fnforcerrent and other law 
enforcement agencies shall be achnitted to a locker club with-
out hindrance or delay 51)ovided they exhibi~oper identification, 
and shall, while the cl is open or While ers or guests 
or visitors are present, he:ve the right to inspect: 
(1) The premises of the club; 
(2) lily locker therein; 
(3) Current rrernber and guest list and authorized 
guest lo~ of the club, and 
(4) The clubs current audited statement." (Emphasis added) 
In view of this Court's prior decisions in \\'heeler and Vagabond, ~ 
Section 16-6-13. 7 (9) and Regulation A96-0l-5. 4 may well be invalid; however, th 
are not being directly challenged in this Appeal, because the liquor agent did 
not present any credentials or identification, and therefore the agent was 
not acting in accordance with the statute and regulation. 
In addition to the statute and regulation, the U~ah Liquor Control 
Ccmnission does extract a consent fo= from every applicant for a license from 
the Corrmission. fuwever, the consent fo= does not expressly dispense with 
I 
the statutory and regulatory requirerrent of presenting credentials and exhibitirc: 
proper identification before entering the Club, but even if the consent form 
did dispense with the identification requirerrent, if municipalities cannot by 
ordinance, and the State carmot by statute, provide for a waiver of one's right0 ! 
respecting warrantless searches and seizures, then the Ccmnission certainly !1\3.Y 
not require a waiver of those rights by extracting a consent fo= as part of 
the licensing process by the threat of denial of a license. Nevertheless, the 
consent form as extracted only provides a consent to perr:U.t achnittance to 
"inspect completely the entire club house, club quarters, all books and records I 
of said corporation and any locker therein, '' and does not consent to a surreyt:J 
transactional testing of the Club's procedures for preventing tmauthorized 
purchases. 
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CONCT.l.JSION OF POINT I 
The conduct of the agents in this case was in violation of Petitioner's 
rights to be free from warrantless searches. The statute, regulations and consent 
fonn, even if pennissible, do not validate the agents' conduct in this case. 
The Comnission should be reversed and its order vacated. 
POillT II 
THE STAWTORY PROVISION WHICH THE CilJB STANYON STREET WAS 
FOUND ID HAVE VIOIATED, UTAH CODE h'lNOTATED SECTION 16-6-
13 . 1 (9) DOES till PROSCRIBE h'fl ACTIVTIY OF THE CilJB, BUT 
ONLY PROSCRIBES THE ACTIVI1Y OF THE PERSON l!AKJN; T'..-!E PURCHASE. 
The Comnission purported to find a violation of Utah GJde Annotated 
Section 16-6-13.1(9). That section provides: 
No person other than a member or guest who holds a valid 
guest card issued pursuant to the provisions of subsection 
16-6-13.7(13) rna.y IIEke any E¥Ichase fran a State store located 
on the premises of a socialCUb, recreational, athletic or 
other kindred associations. (Thiphasis added) . 
Ch its face, the subsection regulates the conduct of the persons purchasing 
liquor. The statute is not ambiguous; it is not vague. In fact, it is quite 
clear. lli its face, the provision applies to any person who l!Ekes a purchase 
from a private club. Additionally, the legislative history supports such a 
construction. 
Subsection (9) was added to this section in 1977. The preface to 
the full section was also changed, although the West supplerrent fails to reflect 
that change. As published in Laws of Utah, 1977 - the preface as adopted reads: 
16-6-13.1 Clubs storing or pennitting comsU11ption of liquor 
on premises - Bond - Filing of articles, bylaws and house rules -
Federal malt liquor revenue starrp - Establisl:im:!nt of State liquor 
store - Restrictions - Uernber or guest card required for wchases -
Definitions of terms - Ll.cense constitutes consent of loca 
authority. (Enphasis added). 
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When it enacted the amendrrent, the legislature intended to add a 
regulation not already covered by the section subject matter. 
'The purchaser's activity is already a matter of criminal control. 
'The Utah C:Ode Annotated Section 32-7-11 provides: 
''Except as provided in this act , no person shall , within this 
state, by himself, his clerk, erJllloyee or agent atterrpt to purchase, 
or directly or indirectly or upon any pretense or upon any 
device, purchase or in consideration of the sale or transfer 
of any property, or for any other consideration, or at the 
time of the transfer of any property, take or accept any 
alcoholic beverage from any other person." (E.rrpfusis added). 
As a parallel to those criminal provisions, the legislature added a provision 
to this title to regulate the conduct of purchasers. By adding subsection (9) 
and the corresponding topic heading, the legislature amended the statute to 
provide that purchasers be regulated. 
'The new subsection follows several other general provisions. Serre 
of those other provisions regulate the licensee in its bonding and other 
docum:mtary requirerrents. (Subsections 16-6-13.1(1) through (3) and (6)). 
Satre regulate and specify Corrrnission authority. (Subsection 16-6-13.1(5) and 
Che subsection expressly restricts licensee activity including sales, and provid~1 
that no vendor, officer, errployee or other agent of a licensee shall furnish 
liquor to (1) any minor, (2) any person actually, apparently or obviously dnnlk, 
(3) any known habitual drunkard, or (4) any known interdicted person. (StibsectL~· 
16-6-13.1(8)). If Subsection 16-6-13.1(9) had been intended to apply to 'llle 
Club, it should have been listed among the restrictions of Subsection 16-6-13.l!; 
. ! 
and should have used a term such as "sell" rather than the term "purchase." 
Finally, the new provision (Subsection 16-6-13.1(9) governs only 
the purchase of liquor. Unlike the other restrictions set forth before it, 
Subsection 16-6-13.1(9) does not govern activities of the licensee or of the 
Comni.ssion. Rather, it is directed solely to the activities of the purchaser 
i 
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Under that provision, an individual violates the liquor Control ACt by purchasing 
liquor from a club without first cOf!lllying with rrembership requirements. Yet, 
the Conmission erroneously found the section to apply to the licensee. 
In State, in Interest of Goodman, 531 P.2d 478 (Utah 1975) this Court 
rejected a position similar to that taken by the Cornnission. In Goodman, the 
evidence demmstrated that appellant, a minor, was intoxicated. At a hearing, 
she was found to have violated certain criminal provisions, aI1D11g which was 
Utah Code Annotated Section 32-7-15 which provided: 
(1) No person shall sell or ~ply alcoholic beverages to 
any person under the age of 2 years. (Emphasis Added) . 
reversing the trial court, this court held: 
Evidence of intoxication does not show nor intend to show a 
violation of the statute above set forth. It is quite 
evident from a reading of the statute that it deals with an 
entirely different subject matter. The Court nevertheless 
found Joanie guilty or violating that provision. The 
Court was in error in that finding. Id. at ·479. 
(El:nphasis added) . -
Likewise, in this case, the Cornnission misinterpreted subsection 
16-6-13.1(9) to conclude that it prohibited club activity. The section's only 
prohibition against club sale is clearly set forth in the i.rmediately preceeding 
subsection which The Club has not violated. Subsection 9 simply does not 
speak or add to any prohibited club activities. The Cornnission erred in finding 
otherwise. 
CONCllJSION OF POL."Il' II 
BeCa:use the Conmission purported to base a suspension upon a 
statutory provision which proscribed purchase by individuals rather than 
sales by the club, the finding of a violation rrust be invalidated, and the 
penalty imposed by the Conmission rrust be vacated. 
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POINT III 
IN ENACTING REGUI.ATION A96-0l-5 (6) (a), THE CG1MISSION 
EXCEEDED ITS AUT'dORITY IN PURPORTIN:; TO REGUI.A1E ACTIVITY 
NOT O'IHERWISE PROSCRIBED IN THE STAWTES, AND FAILED IN ANY 
EVENT TO FIX STA!IDARDS FOR WHAT CONDUCT IS PROHIBTIED. 
Under the liquor Control Act, the Coomission is given broad power 
to control the ''possession, sale, transportation and delivery of alcoholic 
beverages ... " Utah Code Arm. §32-l-6(c). The Corrrnission has the general 
po~r to "grant, refuse, suspend or cancel perrnits or licenses for the purchase 
sale or use of liquor." (Id. §32-l-6(d)) In that sarre section, the Conmission 
is charged with I!l3.intaining a policy I!l3.Ilual which shall include as a minimum 
"the basis upon which decisions will be I!l3.de for granting or revoking permits 
or licenses ... " (Id. §32-l-6(l)(i)) Finally, under Section 32-1-7, the c.omri;~ 
has ~r to make regulations "not inconsistent with this act." 
Regulation A96-0l-5(6)(a), which is the regulation that Club Stanyon 
Street was found to have violated, provides: 
''No person shall be granted the use of the premises of the 
locker club except rrernbers, guests and visitors.'' 
Regulation A96-0l-5(6) (a) rrust fall. It is not a legitim3.te object 
of the liquor Control Act, and as applied it is consistent with both the 
liquor Control Act and due process requirerrents. 
The Corrrnission has no authority to regulate the activity it seeks to 
control. Regulation A96-0l-5 (6) (a) does not specifically control the possessicr · 
I 
sale, transportation, delivery or even the purchase of alcoholic beverages. i 
Rather, the regulation purports to control a wide range of otherwise acceptable 
activity, a control and breadth wmch the Corrrnission itself rejects. Purportin:: 
to restrict the "use" of a locker club premises, the regulation employs a tem, 
so general, that in recent instances even the Conmission has questioned its 
utility. 'Thus , the Corrrnission' s own policy has been not to find a violation f 
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''entry'' and other uses outside the licensee's control have frequently occurred. 
In a hearing held November 15, 1978, at p. 28 of the Transcript, the Chainnan of 
the Utah Liquor Control Comnission, Hr. J.P. 0' Keefe, made the following statemm.ts: 
TiiE CCM-IISSIONER: Let ire ask you a question. This thing 
all gets to the matter of entry. tbw, I don't know. Ever since 
I've been on this Comnission, I've been raising the roof about 
this entry business . This doesn't impress ire a bit. Is there 
anything in the law that predicates entry? 
TiiE CDM,1ISSIONER: Yes. But the use of the club, the 
fact that anyone can walk into the Omntry Club, the Alta 
Club, the Ambassador Club, anyone can walk into them. A 
thief can walk into them. 
TiiE CXM1ISSIONER: This is a waste of ti.ID= on things like 
this What it arrounts to in my estimation is a premises 
check in Which nothing happened. I think Law Enforcemm.t ought 
to make a note of this. I've gone through it so many tim=s 
before. I'm iri no way condoning What has happened here , but 
this business of taking ti.ID= with all this nonsence about 
sorreone getting into a place --
According to its own statenents, the Corrmission is no longer enforcing 
Regulation A96-0l-5(6)(a) as written. Even if the Conrnission had authority 
to promulgate such a regulation, as applied, it is inconsistent with the Liquor 
Control Act, and is therefore, void. To the extent that the Regulation would 
allow the Comnission to exercise unlimited and unfettered discretion in 
categorizing prohibited activity on an ad hoc basis, it is void both under 
Constitutional due process requiremm.ts, and under the statute by which the 
Comnission is charged with promulgating standards for its decisions in 
revoking licenses. tb such standards have been set. 
In Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 388, 15 L.ed 2d 477, 86 S.Ct 
581, the Court stated: 
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"A statute fails to rreet the requirerrents of the due process 
clause if it is so vague and standardless that it leaves the 
public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits, or leaves 
judges and jurors free to decide, without any legally fixed 
standards , what is prohibited and what is not in each case. '' 
Id. at 450. 
In the case at hand, Regulation A96-0l-5(6)(a) is so vague and 
standardless that it leaves private clubs uncertain as to the conduct it prohibi , 
and it left the O:mnission free to decide. without any legally fixed standards, 
what is prohibited and what is not prohibited in each case. and it is submittec 
that not only was the Coornission interpreting the regulation differently in 
each case that was brought before it, but each liquor agent was interpreting 
it differently in determining whether or not to bring charges against the 
various clubs. 
Che other factor which should be considered is that each club has 
its own governing body to detennine how its premises and facilities may be used 
Hany clubs have golf, tennis , swinming, bowling and dining facilities , and the 
governing body of the club is' or smuld be' free to determine how the premises i 
of those facilities may be used. !bwever, if Regulation A96-0l-5 (6) (a) is 
interpreted literally, as has been done against the Club Stanyon Street. then 
it muld be a violation of the liquor laws (regulations) of.this state for ad< 
to pennit a non-member to play golf or tennis on the club premises, even if 
the non-member never consurred an alcoholic beverage. It is clear that the 
Legislature did not intend to give such broad powers to the Utah Liquor Control ! 
Cannission, and that the O:mnission has exceeded its powers by adopting 
Regulation A96-0l-05(6)(a). Tiierefore, the regulation is fatally overbroad 
because the Coornission has failed to focus precisely on the perceived evils it 
wishes to canbat. 
I 
~ 
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CDNCUJSION OF POINI' III 
The regulation nust fall for want of proper authorization and 
because it is vague and does not properly apprise the club of the prohibited 
activity. The comnission has failed to focus precisely on the perceived evils 
it wishes to combat and has failed to set forth the basis upon which a decision 
will be rm.de for revoking a license for its violation. The O:Jrnnission's 
application of the regulation is also inconsistent with the Liquor Control Act 
and violates due process. Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that the 
decision of the Corrrnission nust be reversed and its order rrust be vacated. 
POINI' DJ 
WHERE THERE WAS NO INTENT TO VIOIA1E THE LIQUOR CDNTROL 
ACT OR THE REGULATIONS THEREUNDER, AND WHERE THEP£ WP.5-
NOI' EVEN AiW KNJWI..EI:GE OF THE ALLEGED VIOIATION BY ANY 
OFFICER OR CITHER OFFICIAL OF THE CUJB, THE CCJ.li':ISSION 
MISINI'ERPHEI'ED AND MISAPPLIED THE IAW BY FINDING A VIOIATION 
BY THE CWB STANYON STREET 
If the alleged violations did in fact occur, there was certa.lllly no 
intention to comnit the violations, nor was there evi::>n any knowledge that the 
violations had occurred by any officer, director, or even any ernployee of the 
Corporation, but rather they were just sirrple human errors by waitresses within 
the Club. 
The sale of alcoholic beverages in a private club holding a license 
to sell such alcoholic beverages wa:snot, per se, a violation of the Liquor 
Control Act . Every week there were between 3 , 000 and 6 , 000 valid transactions 
in the Club wherein alcoholic beverages were legally and lawfully sold to 
nembers of the Club. 
The Club clearly atternpted to corrply with the law, and a witness who 
was an ernployee of the Liquor Division testified that on seventeen (17) attempted 
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inspections in the eighteen (18) IIDnths prior to the alleged incidents in this 
proceeding, and at least three (3) attempted inspections between the incidents 
and the tine of the hearing, liquor agents attempted to gain admittance to the u 
but they were either t:raned away or did not note any violations. (T. 43 and 62) 
One of the alleged purchases was made at the height of the evening 
rush at 7:30 p.m. from a waitress of three to four years who was normally very 
concientious, and the other was allegedly made by a waitress on her first day 
of ernployrrent after she cane back from the restroom and was told by the bartende: 
to serve the drink to a person whom the waitress could reasonably have presurred 
had been verified as a m:rnber by the bartender. Each of the alleged incidents 
occurred because of simple human error or oversight, and there was no evidence 
presented at the hearing, and there was not even any allegation or insinuation 
that any officer, director, manager, any policy making or responsible official 
encouraged or even knew of the alleged violations. In fact, Hr. Roy Kohler, 
the manager of the Club, testified that he did not even have any knowledge of 
I 
the alleged violations until five or six weeks after they had allegedly occurreci' 
Even if the statutory prohibition which the Corrrnission purports to 
apply were addressed to the alleged actions of the Club Stanyon Street, the 
legislature has specifically required that the lack of intent to violate such lzl 
is a defense. Because the provisions setting forth violations of the Liquor 
Control Act are parallel in their application to both adriti.nistrative and cr:irnin;: 
I 
proceedings, interpretations regarding elerrents of such violations and defenses : 
thereto which are expressly set forth in either chapter should be applied unil~~ 
Under the legislative schene, lack of intent is an absolute defense 
to finding a criminal violation. Section 32-8-31, Utah Code Armotated, 1953. 
as amended, provides : 
I 
~ 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-19-
If any prosecution under this act for the sale or 
keeping for sale or other disposal of alcoholic 
beverages , or the having, giving, purchasing, or 
consuming of alcoholic beverages, it shall not be 
necessary that any witness should depose to the 
precise description or quantity of the alcoholic 
beverages sold, disposed of, kept, had, given, pur-
chased, or consurred, or the precise consideration, 
if any, received therefore, or to the fact of t..1-ie 
sale or other disposal having taken place with his 
participation or to his own personal or certain 
knowledge, but the burden of proof shall be upon 
the Defendant to shOw laCk ofkilowledge or consent 
to illegal use. (Fi!iPhasis Added) . 
In effect, the legislature has restated the cormon law that intent is a 
necessary eleirent of such violations. Unless a different standard is clearly 
expressed, such legislative policy applies to administrative proceedings as well. 
Although an administrative proceeding need not apply the standard 
of criminal prosecutions, i.e., beyond a reasonable doubt, to find a violation, it 
rmy not find a violation in the total absence of an essential elerrent. In the 
proceeding before the Qmmission, the Club introduced uncontroverted evidence 
that there was no intent, knowledge or consent by managem=nt, and no intent, 
knowledge or consent even by the waitresses, to any purchases from or in the Club 
which were not fully in accordance with the law. Irideed, the oti.ly enployees 
inwl ved in the transactions were not shown to have known or consented to the so-
called "illegal sales." Manageirent was not shown to have known, and there 
is no evidence of recklessness. 
Although the Qmmission has wide discretion in ~sing its sanctions, 
in fact, it may not find a violation for rn:man error or oversight absent an 
intent or faulty precautionary rreasures of the Club or its manageirent. To do so 
'MJuld inwlve an inconsistent application of the sane provisions in t1MJ different 
arenas without statutory authority, without notice of such treatrrent, and in 
violation of 1he Club Stanyon Street's right to due process. 
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Further, the Corrrnission' s cause is not advanced if it argues that the 
statute is unclear with regard to the mandated administrative interpretation to 
pennit it to purportedly exercise its discretion and impose strict liability un~: 
its rules and regulations §A96-0l-5 (6) (a). Rather, such administrative inter-
pretation nust be expressly set forth under the statute, or for the sake of 
argurent the regulations proaulgated thereunder. Even if the Corrrnission had autl::J 
to dispense with the elenent of the intent, it may not do so without prior 
notice defining such policy so as to apprise persons of the required conduct. 
Yet, the effective regulation, A96-0l-5(6) (a) under which the Ccrnnission purpone: 
to find a violation makes no mzntion that intent is not a necessary elerIEnt. 
By contrast, the Corrrnission regulations do provide that violations of regulatior. 
A96-0l-3 'Which governs manufacturers, producers and wholesellers of alcoholic 
beverages shall not require intent. As part of that regulation, the Qmnission 
has pronulgated regulation A96-0l-3 (5) , which provides : 
/my violation of the ·letter or spirit of this regulation, 
either intentional or otherwise, shall be sufficient 
reason for the ll!Irediate discontinuance of all business 
relations between the Utah liquor O:mtrol Qmnission 
and the offender, and the Utah liquor O:mtrol Corrrnission 
shall be sole judge as to ...tiat activities shall constitute 
such violation. (Fnphasis added). 
CDNCliJSION OF POINT N 
There was not even an allegation in the charges or at the hearing of 
any intent or knowledge, and the evidence and even the findings thereon wuld 
not support the conclusion that the necessary elerrent of intent existed. The 
evidence of the efforts of club managenent to prevent unauthorized purchases 
was uncontroverted, and the record was uncontroverted that the alleged sale was 
at the very ~rst the result of an error or oversight by cocktail waitresses 1.t.: 
knew the club rules, but for sorre inexplicable reason, failed to heed them. 
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POilIT V 
TilE COivHISSION DENIED DUE PROCESS OF I.AH 1YJ TilE CLUB STANYON 
STREET BECAUSE PETITIONER HAD A PROCEDURAL RIGHT TO DISCOVERY, 
BUT TrlAT RIGHT WAS DENIED BY TilE CCT·l1MISSION 1.JHEN IT REFUSED 
TO PERMIT DISCOVERY. 
The State is given wide latitude in the exercise of its police p~r 
to regulate and control the use and sale of liquor. However, in effecting and 
enforcing such regulation, the State, or in this case, its duly constituted 
Comnission, must follow general due process requirem:nts. Also, the Corrmission 
Ill.lSt follow the regulations which it promulgates as well as the applicable 
statutes. 
A cardinal procedural right in a state administrative hearing is the 
right to prepare the Comnission's own rules and announced policies recognize that 
right. Paragraph 2, page 6 of the policy manual provides : 
The Corrmission may irrn'ediately revoke or suspend a license 
if after a hearing at which the licensee receives evel)' 
o~ortunit¥ to defend himself, the Corrmission is conVlilced 
t t the violation of the liquor laws or regulations has 
occurred. (Emphasis added) 
Rules of Procedure, Rule 2(3) provides: 
Ri~ht of Parties. 
(a All parties shall be entitled to introduce evidence, 
examine and cross-examine witnesses, make argunents, and 
generally participate 111 the proceeding. (E'nphasis added). 
Rules of Procedure, Rule 3(1)(1) provides: 
(1) Initiation of Formal Hear~. 
(a) By the Comnission. Coomission may initiate a 
formal hearing upon its own rrotion to detennine matters within 
its adjudicatory authority. If the hearing is directed toward 
a respondent, it shall serve on the respondent an order to show 
cause or other notice or order suitable to the purposes of the 
hearing which shall be set forth in ordinary and concise language 
the acts or omissions with vtdch the respondent is charged, or 
the issues to be determined at the hearing, to the end that the 
re dent will be able to re are his or its defense. Tue 
t statutes an es involved 
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Under the U:mrnission's regulations, the right to prepare includes 
the right to discovery. (See Rules of Procedure, Rule 8 (14) '"*1.i.ch provides for 
Depositions.) In this case, petitioner sought to exercise its right to prepare 
and to discover by seeking an early visual inspection of the agents and by 
also subrnitting written Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Docurrents 
in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R.116). Those Interrogato:: 
and Requests included matters '"*1.i.ch ~re necessary to prepare a defense in the 
case, such as asking when inspections of the Club had been made, the name of the 
agent making any inspections, and requesting a copy of all reports submitted on 
~ Club by the agents. Without receiving a response to that properly filed 
discovery and without pennitting the waitress to view the agent, there was no 
way the Club or its Cotmsel could prepare a defense. The refusal of the 
O:Jmnission to permit discovery was clearly prejudicial to Petitioner. 
The problems '"*1.i.ch ~re caused by the U:mrnission when it refused to 
permit discovery was explained at the hearing by Mr. Kohler, the manager of 
the Club, shen he was asked regarding the first alleged violation, as follows: 
Q. lliw, in that capacity, have you gone back and reviewed what 
occurred on the night of November 14, '"*1.i.ch was the night 
of the first alleged violation? 
A. I attempted to. 
Q. Who was on duty at that tine? 
A. Ch one alleged violation, the employee, it was her very 
first day. That was the first day that she had i;.;orked. 
And I IIEiltioned--that was at the tine--well, all right. 
Ch the--that was a girl by the name of Cathy vtio was 
an employee, full-tine employee with the Bureau of Land 
Managenent. She' s an extrerrel y conscientious person, and 
she i;.;orks part tine with the Club, and she has for about 
three or four years. I have known her to be very diligent, 
conscientious. She was totallt tmable to reconstruct what 
ha~pened six ~ekS a5o. our c Ub is popular with its Jreriibers' 
an ~may haVe 4,00 people or 4,000 transactions in a ~ek's 
tine. And to ask her to reconstruct What happened six weeks 
before that was a VirtUa1 impossibility. I don't even l<iiOW 
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if the i,;entlernan was in the Chm. I'm going just by "-Drd. 
(Emphasis added). (T.49-50). 
Concerning the second alleged incident, he said: 
TIIE WITNESS: I don't know. I can't !$(? back six weeks and pick 
it out that carefully. And the waitress, of course, haS 
no idea of What happened six weeks previous. Arid she Ymlld--
she is a very honest person and Ymlldn't lie. She doesn't 
know. There is no wa for us to know if it even ha ened. 
It was a rront an a e ore we were even 
What we supposedly did. 
Q. (By Mr. Davis:) Can you relate now to the second occasion 
or second alleged violation of November 22 and who was the 
waitress at that tine? 
A. That was a girl who had started on her very first day. 
Q. And do you rerranber her nam:?? 
A. Yes. Parrela Hendy. That was the first day she was enployed 
at our chm. 
Q. And is she still enployed at your club? 
A. No. 
Q. Did this alleged violation have anything to do with her 
termination? 
A. It affected it, yes. 
Q. Now, did you discuss this alleged violation With her? 
A. I did. 
Q. And -.;hat did she have to say about the alleged violation. 
A. She really--all she said is, "I've checked everybody's card like 
you've told ire to, like I've been told to. I can't believe I 
served sonebody without a card. " And I don't know whether 
she did or not. 
Q. Now, when did you first receive notice of this alleged violation? 
A. In the first portion of January. 
Q. And this was for violations which oc=ed in N:Jvember of 1978? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. So that was five to six weeks prior? 
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A. 'lliat's correct. 
Q. 1'bw, in that time you rrentioned ear lier, I think, that you have 
about 4,000 transactions per week. 
A. Between 3,500 and 6,000 as an average per week. 
Q. lbw many rrenbers of your club are there? 
A. AlnDst 6,000. 
Q. Have tlu attenpted t~ back and reconstruct in every way 
possi e WbatTiiight happened on thOse occasions? 
A. It "is a virtual impossibility. 
Q. Upon receiving the letter dated January 2, 1979, were 
you concerned about the time lapse at that time? 
A. I was very concerned. 
Q. And did you then prepare a letter addressed to the Utah 
Liquor Control c.orrmission? 
A. I did. 
(Whereupon, Exhibit E was 
marked for identification.) 
Q. (By Mr. Davis:) I show you what has now been marked as 
Exhibit Nt.unber E and ask if that is the letter that you prepared? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And have you ever received a response to that letter? 
A. A !lDnth or so later, I believe, I received a letter saying, 
"It is not our policy to do this." 
No, I received a letter that said, ''Your request has been 
forwarded to Liquor Law Enforcemmt." 
Q. And have they ever responded? 
A. 
Q. 
I've had no response of any sort. 
Have you been able to have your waitresses view the agent that 
allegedly made a purcllase in your--
A. No. (Enphasis added) (T.50-53). 
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The C.onmission chainren has himself recognized the problem when the 
employee is not :innediately confronted: 
''It seems to rre that the Ll~r Law Enforcement must be 
prepared to cOrifTont the cl offiCJ.als at the tine the 
o£rense is detected. This point has been brought up on 
other occasions, but apparently all that has happened is 
that within a day or ~ of the offense, the club is notified 
that an offense has oca.=ed. I recognize that there are 
se=ity problems involved. One of these is the identification 
of agents and the other is the risk of :innediate reprisal 
(physical hann) against the agents. 
Accordingly, I suggest that you and the Attorney General get 
together with Llquor Law Enforcerrent with a view toward 
rennving this ersistent weakness in the rosecution of 
violations o e State mr aws. 0 Kee e Herrorandum 
to Kenneth F. Wim dated 1 0/78)." (Finphasis added). 
In the rreuorandum quoted above from the Cl1airman of the Comnission, 
he was concerned about a delay of a day or ~, but in this case there was a 
delay of alrrost six weeks. 
CONCUJSION OF POINT V 
Despite the dangers, in this case, the State set up a situation where 
one of a myriad of like transactions became the focal point of inquiry, but where 
only the state knew the participants. The situation could not have been better 
designed to inevitably lead to the conclusion reached: Inconclusive recollection 
by the employee and lack of a meaningful right to cross-examine the agents. 
1his procedure did not afford due process. Petitioner is entitled to have the 
Comnission's Order vacated on this ground alone. 
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aJNOlJSION 
'lllis is a case of an administrative agency abusing the rights of 
the parties it regulates. It is also a case which cries out for the exercise 
of this Court's constitutional power to control the inferior tribunals of the 
State. M:my of the abuses and denials of rights derronstrated by the record, 
by the Petitioner on file and by this brief are of serious and irrerredial, 
incorrectable magnitude, any one of which W'.)uld constitute grounds for vacating 
the Cornnission's order. 
Other matters corrplained of, might in isolation, be vie\~d as 
inconsequential, hannless or trivial. On examination of the whole case, howeve: 
Petitioner sulxni.ts that the Court can arrive at the following conclusions: 
In this case, the Comni.ssion repeatedly ignored its own regulations. 
In this case, the Comni.ssion was blind to Petitioner's rights to 
administrative due process, to freedom from warrantless searches, and to 
substantive due process. 
In this case, the Comni.ssion permitted evidence obtained in searches 
made without a search warrant or without even following its own statutes relatim 
to presenting identification before performing any searches, it refused to 
permit discovery, it followed a statute which does not proscribe any activity 
of 1he Club, it enacted and allowed a regulation which far exceeded its 
administrative powers, and it failed to allege or find any knowledge, consent or 
intent when such a finding is necessary before a violation may be found. 
1he sum and substance of the Comni.ssioner' s actions in this case 
equal administrative lawlessness. 
'lllis Court IllJSt also provide a rerredy. Petitioner submits the prope' 
raiedy is a declaration that the Conmi.ssion has denied Petitioner rights of S\l. 
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i.rrportance and magnitude and in contexts which are incapable of corrective 
action at this ti.Ire. tb rehearings can care for substantial errors and abuse. 
TI1e order of suspension must be nullified and vacated and the natter closed. 
DATED this 29th day of February, 1980. 
M:JRGAN, SCALLEY & DAVIS 
/' <.t?~\ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILI!I; 
I hereby certify that I mailed too true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Petitioner to John ~!cAllister, Assistant Attorney General, 
236 State Capitol Building, Salt lake City, Utah, 84114, postage prepaid, this 
29th day of February, 1980. 
'\ cf'/~~ fa. J 
G. Blaine Davis 
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